Status: [UNTESTED] Endpoints found: https://localhost:3000/v1/admin/keys https://localhost:3000/v1/forward Source: https://github.com/mallard1983/ferrowarden # Ferrowarden [![Test](https://github.com/mallard1983/ferrowarden/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/mallard1983/ferrowarden/actions/workflows/test.yml) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE) A credential proxy for AI agents. Agents send API calls with `{{vault:name}}` placeholders; Ferrowarden substitutes real credentials, forwards the call to the target service, scrubs credentials from the response, and returns the result. **The agent never sees a credential value.** Built as a sidecar to [Vaultwarden](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden), using the Bitwarden CLI (`bw serve`) as the vault API layer. --- ## The Problem An AI agent that manages infrastructure needs credentials — API tokens, passwords, service keys. The straightforward approaches all have the same problem: the credential value ends up in the conversation context, where it can appear in logs, model outputs, or error messages. Giving the agent a credential directly is not acceptable for a security-first deployment. ## The Solution Ferrowarden gives the agent two things: 1. **A list of credential names** (`GET /v1/credentials`) — the agent knows what credentials exist, never their values. 2. **A proxy endpoint** (`POST /v1/forward`) — the agent sends the API call it wants to make, using `{{vault:name}}` as a placeholder wherever a credential belongs. Ferrowarden substitutes the real value, makes the call, and returns the response with any credential patterns scrubbed out. The agent token itself is scoped only to ferrowarden — it cannot reach Vaultwarden, the vault CLI, or any other service directly. --- ## Architecture ``` ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Host / Docker │ │